As a result, AGNC's economic return in the first quarter was negative 1.6%. In the first quarter, however, the Middle East conflict caused interest rate volatility to increase and Fed rate cuts to become more uncertain. More importantly, many of the other factors that I discussed actually improved in the first quarter and now further strengthen the outlook for Agency MBS. Most notably, at current spread levels, the return profile on Agency MBS is more attractive.

At the time of our fourth quarter earnings conference call, the spread differential between current coupon MBS and a blend of swaps was 135 basis points. Over the last two months, that spread has ranged between 150 basis points and 175 basis points as a result of heightened geopolitical and macroeconomic risks. The supply outlook for Agency MBS also improved in the first quarter. With mortgage rates now about 50 basis points higher, MBS supply could be $50 billion-$70 billion lower this year.

The demand outlook for Agency MBS improved in the first quarter as well. Money manager demand for MBS increased materially in the first quarter as bond fund inflows came in about double the pace of the previous two years. bank regulators also released their proposed bank regulatory capital framework for comment. As expected, the proposal includes lower capital requirements for high-quality mortgage credit.

What went well
  • Net spread and dollar roll income rose $0.07 to $0.42 per share, the highest level in about a year
  • Net interest spread expanded 25 basis points to 206 bps, implying a near-20% return on equity
  • Agency MBS outperformed U.S. Treasuries and investment-grade corporates despite spreads widening to swaps
  • Tangible net book value recovered about 6% in April (5% net of dividend), largely reversing the Q1 decline
  • Issued $401 million of common equity via the ATM at a premium to book, accretive to both book value and earnings
  • Improved TBA implied financing / roll specialness (incl. Ginnie Mae) lifted dollar roll income
What went wrong
  • Economic return on tangible common equity was negative 1.6% for the quarter
  • Reported a comprehensive loss of $0.18 per common share
  • Tangible net book value per share fell $0.50 on wider mortgage spreads to benchmark rates
  • Middle East conflict (war in Iran) spiked rate volatility and widened Agency MBS spreads in March
  • Fed rate-cut path turned uncertain, at one point pricing in potential tightening

Guidance Changes

MetricPeriodCurrent guidance
Net spread and dollar roll incomenext several quartershigh $0.30s to low $0.40s per share
Current coupon MBS spread to blend of swapscurrent / near term~151 bps, ranged 150-175 bps
Implied ROE on new investmentcurrentroughly 15%-17%, centered ~16%, in line with total cost of capital
Net new Agency MBS supplyfull-year 2026$50-$70 billion lower with mortgage rates ~50 bps higher

Performance Breakdown

MetricYoYNote
Net spread and dollar roll income $0.42/share, up $0.07 QoQ (highest in ~a year) Greater swap allocation in hedges, lower repo funding cost, more favorable TBA implied financing, and a modest rise in asset yield
Net interest spread (margin) +25 bps QoQ to 206 bps Same swap/repo/TBA financing tailwinds plus reduced compensation expense vs. Q4 year-end accrual
Tangible net book value per share -$0.50 in the quarter Wider mortgage spreads to benchmark rates driven by March geopolitical volatility
At-risk leverage 7.4x tangible equity at quarter end, up from 7.2x in Q4 (avg unchanged at 7.4x) Modest portfolio growth while staying within targeted spread-based range (7.0x-7.5x intra-quarter)
Average projected life CPR +70 bps to 10.3% from 9.6% Prepayment model updates and portfolio composition changes, partly offset by higher mortgage rates
Actual CPR 13.2% vs. 9.7% prior quarter Faster realized prepayment speeds during the quarter
Weighted average portfolio coupon declined to 4.95% from 5.12% Purchases and rotation down in coupon into low-coupon specified pools amid heavy money-manager index buying

Earnings Call Themes & Trends

TopicPrevious mentionCurrent periodTrend
TBA implied financing / roll specialnessUnattractive for much of the prior two years (through repo levels since the 2023 regional banking crisis, QT and regulation)Back to through or equal to repo, meaningfully better for several coupons; enabled long/short TBA positions and lifted dollar roll income
Agency MBS spreads vs. swaps/Treasuries135 bps (current coupon to swap blend) at Q4 call~150-175 bps to swaps, ~120 bps to Treasuries; viewed as compelling absolute and relative value
GSE activityJan 8th directive for GSEs to buy $200 billion of Agency MBS pushed spreads tighterFramed as opportunistic/economic (buying when spreads are wide), reducing mortgage spread volatility and attracting a broader investor base
Hedging / duration postureSwap hedge allocation 70% of duration dollars; hedge ratio kept low to benefit from lower short ratesSwap allocation raised to 78% (hedge notional $64B); hedge ratio net of receiver swaptions ~83%; positive duration gap for down-rate prepayment protection; described as neutral
Capital raisingExpected slower, opportunistic issuance$401 million raised in Q1, faster than planned to capitalize on volatility; accretive and mostly deployed at ~16% returns vs. ~13.5% dividend yield
Low- vs. high-coupon performancen/aLow coupons tightened ~10 bps to Treasuries on heavy money-manager inflows; high coupons widened ~5 bps; bond-fund inflows now slowing

Q&A Summary

Comparing spreads from Q4 quarter-end to now, are returns comparable and what ROE do current spreads imply?
Year-to-date book value is nearly unchanged; current coupon is ~151 bps to swaps and ~120 bps to Treasuries, implying returns of roughly 15%-17%, centered around 16%, in line with the total cost of capital.
TBA/roll specialness improved - how big a contribution is it now?
A significant change after two years of unattractive TBA financing; easing of balance-sheet pressure (end of QT, reserve purchases, Basel reform) put implied financing back at or through repo, and meaningfully better for several coupons and Ginnie Mae, allowing long/short TBA positions that boosted dollar roll income.
Net spread and dollar roll income was very strong - is it sustainable, or will it compress toward the dividend?
The 206 bps margin (~20% ROE) is above the long-run economics of this environment; a reasonable near-term range over the next several quarters is high $0.30s to low $0.40s, supported by TBA financing and eased repo pressure now that repo trades in the middle of the Fed funds target.
Hedge ratio ticked up but is still low versus history - how comfortable are you at 65%-75% versus past 90%+ levels?
The hedge ratio net of receiver swaptions is ~83%, keeping the portfolio positioned to benefit if short rates fall toward the ~3% neutral target, at which point they would close the hedge ratio and lock in cheap funding; given rate uncertainty they are currently neutral but closed it somewhat when two-year rates dipped near 3.18%.
How do you think about optimal leverage in a supportive-but-volatile environment?
Leverage is set to the expected spread range with sufficient excess liquidity to withstand stress without delevering or changing asset composition; it stayed near 7.0x-7.5x during the quarter, and wider spreads let them earn excellent returns at a reasonable leverage level, with the right level informed by how conditions unfold.
With GSE activity framed as opportunistic rather than programmatic, how does that shape coupon selection and relative value?
GSEs are expected to buy economically when spreads widen (as in March), which dampens mortgage spread volatility, benefits mortgage rates, and attracts a broader investor base (banks, money managers, foreign investors) - a virtuous cycle that lets more levered capital enter and ultimately lowers mortgage rates.
You didn't add much to the portfolio during the March widening - what would you need to see to add significantly, and does GSE buying add confidence?
Portfolio grew only $1.7 billion through quarter-end; continued positive geopolitical/macro developments that improve the inflation outlook would be positive for growth, mortgages at 150-160 bps are attractive long term, and GSEs stepping in to buy cheap mortgages would be supportive.
Where in the coupon stack are you finding the best value?
Purchases (under $2 billion) were concentrated in lower-coupon specified pools, with a portion of the portfolio rotated down in coupon because tracked bond-fund inflows were running materially faster and would drive low-coupon outperformance; inflows have since slowed, so they will stay opportunistic.
Can you give color on the timing of the Q1 equity raises and whether the rest of the year will be similarly opportunistic?
The ~$400 million raised was faster than anticipated due to unexpected volatility; it was accretive to book value (trading at a premium) and to earnings, deployed at ~16% returns versus a ~13.5% dividend yield, and having more capital during volatility is beneficial though issuance and deployment don't always align in timing.
How do you weigh capitalizing on better roll specialness versus keeping prepayment protection in specified pools?
Improved specialness won't necessarily grow the net TBA position (average only rose to 10.3% from 9.6% yet income was higher); TBA is now used to deploy capital quickly without losing carry, then rotate into specified pools over time, keeping ~77% of assets with favorable prepayment characteristics and a positive duration gap.

More on AGNC Investment Corp.

Reported 2026-04-21 · figures from the AGNC Investment Corp. Q1 2026 earnings call.

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